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ABSTRACT
Modern technology and the internet have radically transformed the
ways in which individuals interact and communicate. At the forefront
of this digital-speech movement are social media sites like Twitter and 
Facebook, which the Supreme Court has identified as among “the most 
important places . . . for the exchange of views”1 in our modern culture.
But these platforms are not just for private citizens; government 
officials also use social media sites as a way to connect with their
constituents. However, First Amendment questions have arisen as these
officials have sought to regulate their pages by “blocking” individual 
users. To date, three cases have held that individual government
officials at several levels of federal, state, and municipal government
violated the “public forum doctrine” by blocking individuals from their
social media pages.
This Note posits that the public forum analyses employed in these
cases fail to address a fundamental question, however: When is it 
appropriate to apply the public forum doctrine to individual 
government officials’ conduct? Through a survey of applicable public
forum precedent, this Note suggests an amendment to the doctrine that 
effectively establishes when individual government officials act with the 
requisite authority such that they can be considered government entities
capable of creating a public forum. 
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INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 2017, in the wake of the Charlottesville attacks,2 
Republican Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina tweeted: “We must 
stand together to condemn racism & violence. We are the American
family, and will not be divided by hate. #Charlottesville.”3 In response,
one user replied: “Second place for House Ni**er of the year is Tim 
Scott.”4 Nearly one and a half years later, this tweet remains in the
conversation thread under Senator Scott’s original message.5 
On February 7, 2019, Democratic Congresswoman Ilhan Omar, a 
Muslim representative for Minnesota’s Fifth District,6 tweeted 
“#Not1Dollar more for ICE” in response to a video posted of her 
speaking at an immigration rally.7 In the video, Representative Omar 
is wearing her hijab.8 Reply tweets poured in; among messages alleging
her affiliation with the Islamic State9 and calling her an anti-Semite,10 
one commenter11 wrote: “Will you be voting to legalize suicide
2. For a full account of the Charlottesville events, see Maggie Astor, Christina Caron &
Daniel Victor, A Guide to the Charlottesville Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-virginia-overview.html [https://perma.cc/ 
3CZU-ES8L]. Summarily, on August 12, 2017, white-nationalist groups and counterprotesters
clashed in Charlottesville, Virginia, resulting in one death and at least thirty-four injuries. Id.
3. Tim Scott (@SenatorTimScott), TWITTER (Aug. 12, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
SenatorTimScott/status/896476545539289089 [https://perma.cc/89AL-Z2X9].
 4. my_view_on_the_situation (@Gobble_nuts), TWITTER (Aug. 12, 2017, 7:44 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Gobble_nuts/status/896563012357677056 [https://perma.cc/Z89T-EHJ5]
(using two asterisks in the original tweet). 
5. Id. A conversation thread refers to the interactive spaces below a tweet where users post
replies to the original message. See About Conversations on Twitter, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-conversations [https://perma.cc/22NN-9VZU]
(describing replies in Twitter conversations). Replies in a conversation thread that are from public
Twitter accounts are viewable by the general Twitter public. See id. (“If your Tweets are not
protected, then all replies are public . . . .”).
 6. ILHAN FOR CONGRESS, https://www.ilhanomar.com/about [https://perma.cc/4RCV-
5THJRS5]; U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ILHAN OMAR: SERVING THE DIST. OF MINNESOTA, 
https://omar.house.gov [https://perma.cc/5FSV-KLVX].
7. Ilhan Omar (@IlhanMN), TWITTER (Feb. 7, 2019, 8:06 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
IlhanMN/status/1093541577333587969 [https://perma.cc/TZX4-278G].
 8. Id.
9. larry (@larrymoejoe), TWITTER (Feb. 7, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://twitter.com/larrymoejoe/ 
status/1093639550184890368 [https://perma.cc/VHH2-UZ9S]. 
10. Samuel Kessinger (@KessingerSamuel), TWITTER (Feb. 7, 2019, 3:25 PM), 
https://twitter.com/KessingerSamuel/status/1093652018659450880 [https://perma.cc/45KA-
PYZX].
11. For purposes of this Note, all discussions of users commenting and replying to tweets
refer to a Twitter user’s ability to reply directly to another user’s tweet using the “reply” function.
See About Replies and Mentions, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/mentions-






















   
   
 







   
     
 
 





   
 7032019] WHOSE FORUM IS IT ANYWAY
vests? . . . Maybe ICE should have done a better [job] of keeping your
tribe out of America[.]”12 Similar to Senator Scott, these incendiary 
remarks linger on the conversation thread below Representative
Omar’s tweet.13 
Although these specific derogatory tweets have not spurred real-
world action, disparaging comments like these are increasingly
symptomatic of a larger issue: the proliferation of hate speech on 
digital mediums connected to physical manifestations of violence.14 
Social media sites like Twitter have struggled in recent years to toe the
line between encouraging free expression and regulating offensive or 
dangerous speech.15 Despite efforts to revamp its usage guidelines,16 
Twitter’s regulatory schemes might not be adequate to address these
and-replies [https://perma.cc/MEJ8-G67T]. Certain courts have held these comment pages
constitute public forums. See infra Part II. 
12. Maximus (@maxikbal), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2019, 9:20 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
maxikbal/status/1094828384595525633 [https://perma.cc/K85Q-RABL]. Unfortunately, this
response was not atypical; the comment thread underneath Representative Omar’s tweet was
replete with sexist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic messages. See, e.g., Roger (@ok2bright1),
TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2019, 10:17 AM), https://twitter.com/ok2bright1/status/1094661676622929920 
[https://perma.cc/6U2K-64E4] (“You need to loosen that head scarf to let blood follow [sic] to
your brain.”).
 13. Id.
 14. See Zachary Laub, Hate Speech on Social Media: Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (June 7, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speech-social-media-
global-comparisons [https://perma.cc/WDM3-ATZD] (noting that with the increase of online 
speech, “individuals inclined toward racism, misogyny, or homophobia have found niches that 
can reinforce their views and goad them to violence” and that “[s]ocial scientists and others have 
observed how social media posts, and other online speech, can inspire acts of violence”); Kunal
Relia, Zhengyi Li, Stephanie H. Cook & Rumi Chunara, Race, Ethnicity and National Origin-
Based Discrimination in Social Media and Hate Crimes Across 100 U.S. Cities 8 (Jan. 31, 2019)
(unpublished research study, New York University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(studying the correlation between online hate speech and hate crimes in one hundred cities across 
the United States and finding that “the proportion of social media discrimination that is targeted
was significantly related to the number of [race-, ethnicity-, and national-origin-based] hate
crimes”).
 15. See David Goldman, Big Tech Made the Social Media Mess. It Has To Fix It, CNN (Oct.
29, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/29/tech/social-media-hate-speech/index.html
[https://perma.cc/D57R-N6D5] (detailing efforts by Facebook and Twitter to “stamp out hate
speech and threats of violence”); Cecilia Kang & Kate Conger, Inside Twitter’s Struggle over What
Gets Banned, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/technology/ 
twitter-free-speech-infowars.html [https://perma.cc/37SF-M7AD] (noting Twitter CEO Jack
Dorsey’s difficulty in balancing “Twitter’s longtime guiding principle” of free expression with a
belief that “safety should come first”).
 16. See Louise Matsakis, Twitter Releases New Policy on ‘Dehumanizing Speech,’  WIRED
(Sept. 25, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/twitter-dehumanizing-speech-policy
[https://perma.cc/EWA2-XTK4] (discussing a new Twitter policy that bans “content that
dehumanizes others based on their membership in an identifiable group”).
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704 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:701
issues.17 For example, in the case of Senator Scott and Representative
Omar, the long shelf life of the particular messages described above
highlights the potential ineffectiveness of Twitter’s hate-speech policy, 
which covers only “[v]iolent threats,” “[w]ishing, hoping or calling for
serious harm on a person or group of people,” “[r]eferences to mass 
murder [or] violent events,” “[i]nciting fear about a protected 
category,” “[r]epeated and/or non-consensual slurs, epithets, racist and
sexist tropes, or other content that degrades someone,” and “[h]ateful 
imagery.”18 And Twitter has been unwilling to remove or ban users or 
their messages until that speech explicitly violates these guidelines.19 
Courts have also been reticent to restrict such messages, but for a 
very different reason—the First Amendment. According to traditional 
free-speech principles, the location of speech can critically inform what 
restrictions the government may impose on free expression.20 Over 
time, the Supreme Court has developed the “public forum doctrine” to
govern this inquiry into which speech restrictions are appropriate in 
certain government-owned or government-operated spaces.21 As social 
17. See Jennifer Grygiel, Hate Speech Is Still Easy To Find on Social Media, CONVERSATION
(Oct. 31, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://theconversation.com/hate-speech-is-still-easy-to-find-on-social-
media-106020 [https://perma.cc/CF78-AUTE] (describing the prevalence of violent and
threatening messages on Twitter despite promises from the company to combat hateful and
abusive speech). While prohibiting users from “promot[ing] violence against or directly
attack[ing] or threaten[ing] other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual
orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease,” it
seems unlikely that either of the above instances would rise to the level of “[h]ateful conduct.” 
Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-
conduct-policy [https://perma.cc/2Z4H-8CAW].
 18. Hateful Conduct Policy, supra note 17. For Representative Omar, none of the users made 
explicitly racist comments or slurs. Similarly, although the tweet directed at Senator Scott 
featured a racial slur, the user replaced letters with asterisks, presumably as a way to avoid
detection by Twitter’s algorithm. See Shirin Ghaffary, The Algorithms that Detect Hate Speech
Online Are Biased Against Black People, VOX (Aug. 15, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/ 
recode/2019/8/15/20806384/social-media-hate-speech-bias-black-african-american-facebook-
twitter [https://perma.cc/5MD8-MQHH] (describing the algorithms used by Facebook, YouTube, 
and Twitter to detect hate speech). 
19. For example, in August 2018, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey tweeted a decision not to 
suspend Alex Jones—a far-right conspiracy theorist known for his inflammatory and divisive 
speech—from its site for the “simple” reason that “he hasn’t violated our rules.” jack (@jack), 
TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://twitter.com/jack/status/1026984242893357056
[https://perma.cc/QA5C-MJSJ]; see also Kang & Conger, supra note 15 (discussing Twitter’s
decision not to ban Alex Jones, the criticisms it has received for this decision, and its continued
struggles to overhaul its removal and banning policies). 
20. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:11 (2012)
(“Where speech takes place can determine the outcomes of a free-speech dispute.”).
 21. See id. (discussing the basics of the public forum doctrine).
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media’s popularity has risen over the past decade,22 and as elected 
officials have increasingly turned to powerful platforms like Twitter 
and Facebook to connect with constituents,23 courts have begun to
consider whether government officials’ social media pages constitute
such “public forums.”24 
As of November 2019, three cases have held that various public 
officials, including the chair of the Loudoun County Board of 
Supervisors, three members of the Wisconsin State Assembly, and the 
president of the United States, operated their social media accounts as 
“public forums” and, consequently, that each of these officials violated 
the First Amendment when they “blocked”25 individual users from
those pages.26 These precedents seem to indicate that Senator Scott and 
Representative Omar would be similarly restricted by the First 
22. See Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social Media Profile from 2008 to 2018, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-with-a-social-
network-profile [https://perma.cc/XV9A-CKNB] (detailing that the percentage of the U.S.
population with a social media profile rose from 10 percent in 2008 to 77 percent in 2018).
 23. See Monica Anderson, More Americans Are Using Social Media To Connect with
Politicians, PEW RES. CTR. (May 19, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/ 
19/more-americans-are-using-social-media-to-connect-with-politicians [https://perma.cc/HQ4H-
P9MW] (providing that 16 percent of registered voters in 2014 followed some candidate, political
party, or elected official on social media and discussing how then-presidential candidates Hillary
Clinton, Jeb Bush, and Ted Cruz used social media to announce or discuss their candidacies).
 24. See generally Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226
(2d Cir. 2019) (answering whether the personal Twitter page of President Donald Trump was a 
public forum); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) (assessing whether the Facebook
page for the chair of the Loudoun County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors constituted a public
forum); One Wis. Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (examining whether the 
Twitter pages of three elected members of the Wisconsin State Assembly were public forums);
Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (considering whether a state governor’s
social media accounts constituted public forums); Robinson v. Hunt Cty., No. 3:17-CV-0513-K,
2018 WL 1083838 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2018) (determining whether a county sheriff’s Facebook 
page constituted a public forum), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019).
25. “Blocking” is a Twitter feature that empowers users to restrict other accounts from
contacting them, viewing their tweets, or following them. How To Block Accounts on Twitter, 
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts
[https://perma.cc/FLS6-YF9A].
 26. See Knight, 928 F.3d at 230 (holding that President Trump violated the First Amendment 
by blocking users from his @realDonaldTrump Twitter page); Davison, 912 F.3d at 688
(determining that the Facebook page for the chair of the Loudoun County, Virginia, Board of
Supervisors “constituted a public forum,” and that the chairwoman “engaged in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination when she banned [an individual] from that forum”); One Wis., 354 F.
Supp. 3d at 941 (determining that three elected members of the Wisconsin State Assembly
“violated the First Amendment by blocking [a nonprofit corporation] from their respective
Twitter pages”). 
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Amendment from blocking offensive users from their pages or 
removing hateful comments.  
Though the courts have only just begun applying the public forum 
doctrine in the social media context, legal scholarship has addressed 
the issue thoroughly.27 As such, this Note does not attempt to relitigate 
that well-traversed topic. It accepts the general premise that Twitter 
and other social media sites can—and should—in certain instances 
function as First Amendment public forums. Rather, this Note
identifies a fundamental incongruity with the application of the public 
forum doctrine to the social media context: its regulation of individual 
government actors rather than traditional government entities. 
Importantly, the public forum doctrine requires that a 
“government entity” or “unit of government” create the putative 
public forum.28 In the social media context, however, that precise
doctrinal language is not always easy to apply because individuals—not 
“entities”—create the forum at issue. By not recognizing this 
distinction, the courts applying a forum analysis to officials’ social 
media pages have failed to address explicitly “whether an individual 
public official serving in a legislative capacity qualifies as a unit of 
government or a government entity for purposes of her ability to open 
a public forum.”29 This means government officers at every level are
left wondering “whether any and all public officials, regardless of their 
27. See, e.g., Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment, 
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301, 306 (2013) (arguing that the First Amendment should protect individuals’
right to post on the social media pages of agencies); Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1975, 1979 (2011) (considering the interaction between governmental use of social media 
and the public forum doctrine and “urging the Supreme Court to embrace an interactive model
of government-citizen discourse”). In the past two years, focus has shifted specifically to the 
application of the public forum doctrine to government officials’ social media pages. See generally 
Elise Berry, Note, Suppression of Free Tweets: How Packingham Impacts the New Era of
Government Social Media and the First Amendment, 9 CONLAWNOW 297 (2018) (assessing how
the Court’s ruling in Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) affects the public forum
analysis, particularly in the context of public officials); Samantha Briggs, Note, The Freedom of
Tweets: The Intersection of Government Use of Social Media and Public Forum Doctrine, 52
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (2018) (arguing that government social media pages must be
classified as public forums and that government actors must change their conduct on such sites
accordingly); James M. LoPiano, Note, Public Fora Purpose: Analyzing Viewpoint Discrimination
on the President’s Twitter Account, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 511 (2018)
(articulating how the district court’s analysis in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, 
267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017) could be applied in the then-pending case against Donald
Trump in the Southern District of New York).
 28. See infra Part III.A (making the point that only government entities can create and
operate public forums). 
29. Davison, 912 F.3d at 692 (Keenan, J., concurring). 
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roles, should be treated equally in their ability to open a public forum 
on social media.”30 
This Note seeks to resolve that issue. It argues that only certain 
public officials with the authority to take unilateral, decisive action on
behalf of the government should qualify as government entities 
capable of creating a public forum. The argument proceeds in four 
parts. Part I traces the evolution of First Amendment public forum 
doctrine from its early days to its current form. Part II describes the 
only three cases to hold that government officials’ social media pages 
constitute public forums. Part III identifies fundamental flaws with the
analyses in those cases. Finally, Part IV suggests how the doctrine can 
be refined and improved for application to individual public officials.
It posits that before assessing whether a government official’s social
media page constitutes a public forum, courts need to engage in a 
threshold “government entity” inquiry that asks whether the official 
retains the ability to create a public forum at all. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
At the turn of the twentieth century, the government’s authority
to regulate speech conducted on its property was incredibly broad.31 
But as the Court began to reexamine the scope of First Amendment
protections in the wake of World War I,32 it reconsidered the 
government’s ability to silence speech in public places. This Part traces 
the origins and subsequent evolution of the public forum doctrine from 
the mid-twentieth century to the present. 
Limitations on the government’s ability to restrict speech on its
property garnered sincere attention in the mid-twentieth century when
Justice Owen Roberts wrote his plurality opinion in Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization.33 In Hague, the Court 
30. Id.
 31. See Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s
early [First Amendment] jurisprudence recognized the absolute right of the government to
exclude the public from using its property.”); see also Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48
(1897) (affirming the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’s authority to convict an individual for
speaking in Boston Common without a permit because “[t]he right to absolutely exclude all right
to use necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be
availed of”).
 32. See Norman L. Rosenberg, Another History of Free Speech: The 1920s and the 1940s, 7
LAW & INEQ. 333, 335 (1989) (“First [A]mendment law was reconstructed, if not invented,
between 1919 and 1927.”). 
33. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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considered a First Amendment challenge by a famed labor union—the 
Committee for Industrial Organization (“CIO”)—to a city ordinance 
preventing “the leasing of any hall . . . for a public meeting at which a
speaker shall advocate obstruction of the Government of the United 
States or a State.”34 In sustaining the CIO’s challenge, Justice Roberts 
famously penned:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out 
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks
for communication of views on national questions may be regulated
in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, 
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the 
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.35 
While acknowledging some general limits, the Hague Court recognized 
the fundamental importance of an individual right to free expression in
traditionally public spaces. Though the opinion never referred to the 
public spaces at issue as “public forums,” this dictum is often cited as 
the origin of the Court’s public forum jurisprudence.36 
The term “public forum” was not coined until 1965 when
Professor Harry Kalven Jr. wrote his influential article, The Concept of
the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana.37 In it, Kalven opined: “[I]n an
open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public places
are an important facility for public discussion and political process.
They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can 
34. Id. at 501.
 35. Id. at 515–16 (emphasis added). 
36. See HUDSON, supra note 20, § 2:11 (“The origins of the public-forum doctrine in modern
First Amendment law are traced to Justice Owen Roberts’s opinion in [Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)] . . . .”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (noting Justice Roberts’s opinion in Hague to 
be “a good starting point for the argument” about public forums).
 37. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 20, 35 (1975) (“It was Harry Kalven who coined the term ‘public forum,’ now a 
commonplace of first amendment discourse.”); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and
Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1718 (1987)
(“The phrase ‘public forum’ is traditionally attributed to Harry Kalven’s classic 1965 article, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana.”).
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commandeer . . . .”38 Seven years later, the Court adopted Kalven’s
“public forum” terminology as a First Amendment term of art in Police 
Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley.39 In Mosley, the Court 
articulated that “under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention
the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a 
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those 
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”40 Rather, 
“[o]nce a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups,
government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on 
the basis of what they intend to say.”41 
Four years later, in Greer v. Spock42—a case addressing the right
to speak in the areas of a military instillation open to the public—the
Court established a bright line between public and nonpublic forums43: 
although individuals have the unequivocal right to speak free of 
content-based restrictions in the former,44 they have virtually no First 
Amendment protections in the latter.45 According to the Greer Court,
it did not matter whether the space had previously been open to the 
public.46 Instead, it only mattered whether the area “ha[d] traditionally 
served as a place for free public assembly and communication of 
thoughts by private citizens.”47 If a space lacked these traditional 
attributes, then individuals “had no generalized constitutional right” to 
speak in that place.48 
38. Kalven, supra note 36, at 11–12. 
39. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96–99 (1972) (discussing the restrictions
on the government’s ability to exclude speech from “a public forum”); Post, supra note 37, at 1724 
(“In 1972 the Supreme Court, explicitly acknowledging its debt to Kalven, began to use the phrase 
‘public forum’ as a term of art.” (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96, 99 & n.6)).
 40. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. 
41. Id.
42. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
43. See Post, supra note 37, at 1745 (“The lasting legacy of Greer has been a public forum
doctrine that sharply distinguishes public from nonpublic forums . . . .”).
 44. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (“Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some 
groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content 
alone . . . .”).
 45. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 838 (noting that individuals had “no generalized constitutional
right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets” in an area that was not a public forum). 
46. See id. at 836 (“[T]he principle that whenever members of the public are permitted freely
to visit a place owned or operated by the Government, then that place becomes a ‘public forum’
for purposes of the First Amendment. Such a principle of constitutional law has never existed,
and does not exist now.”).
 47. Id. at 838 (emphasis added). 
48. Id.
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Ultimately, however, this binary distinction between public and 
nonpublic forums proved inadequate to address all of the possible 
intersections between public speech and government regulation.49 The
Court thus refined its public forum doctrine again in Perry Education 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.50 In Perry, the Court considered 
whether a school district’s internal mail system constituted a public 
forum.51 Before holding the internal mail system was a nonpublic 
forum, the Court articulated a new three-category approach to First 
Amendment forum analysis. First, there are “traditional” public 
forums, such as public parks or city sidewalks—“places which by long 
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate.”52 In these “quintessential public forums,” any content-based 
or content-neutral speech restrictions garner strict and intermediate 
scrutiny, respectively.53 Next are “designated” public forums—“public 
property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for 
expressive activity.”54 According to Perry, this second category 
includes places such as “university meeting facilities,” “school board 
meeting[s],” and “municipal theater[s].”55 In these spaces, the 
government is bound by the same restrictions as in a traditional public 
forum.56 
Within its discussion of designated public forums, the Perry Court 
recognized in a footnote that “[a] public forum may be created for a 
limited purpose such as use by certain groups [such as student groups] 
or for the discussion of certain subjects [such as school-board
49. See Post, supra note 37, at 1751 (noting the Court’s recognition in the early 1980s that 
certain situations “did not fit easily into the dichotomous categories of Greer” and its attempt “to
encompass them within a [third forum] category”).  
50. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
 51. Id. at 39. 
52. Id. at 45. 
53. Id.
 54. Id.
 55. See id. at 45–46 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), City of Madison Joint
School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), and Se.
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) as examples of designated public forums). In
conducting a forum analysis, courts that determine a space is not a traditional public forum should
nonetheless move on to this second category. See Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1141 (10th 
Cir. 2016) (“If the district court finds that [an area] is not a traditional public forum, it must next
consider whether [it] has been nevertheless designated as public fora.”); see also 1 RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:7 (2019) [hereinafter SMOLLA &
NIMMER] (“[C]ourts often should proceed to consider the designated public forum analysis even
after determining that property is not a traditional public forum.”).
 56. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
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business].”57 Later Court decisions have branded this subcategory as 
the “limited public forum.”58 In a limited public forum, “[t]he State 
may be justified ‘in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the 
discussion of certain topics.’”59 However, government restrictions in 
these spaces cannot be viewpoint discriminatory, meaning that they
“must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint[] 
and . . . must be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum.’”60 As compared to the content-based standards articulated 
above, this viewpoint-discrimination standard is more permissive in
that government regulators are permitted to restrict speech on a 
particular subject, so long as those restrictions do not disfavor 
particular viewpoints on that subject.61 
57. Id. at 46 n.7 (citations omitted) (first citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); then
citing City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 
(1976)).
 58. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250
(2015) (articulating that a limited public forum “exists where a government has ‘reserv[ed a
forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics’” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995))); Christian Legal
Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11
(2010) (“[G]overnmental entities establish limited public forums by opening property ‘limited to
use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.’” (quoting Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009))). Scholars have described limited public forums
both as a part of designated public forums and as its own separate category of public forum.
Compare HUDSON, supra note 20, § 2:11 (describing limited and designated public forums as the
same category of public forum), with SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 8:8.50 (defining limited 
public forums separately from designated public forums). Courts at varying levels have similarly
conflated the two categories. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 678 (1992) (noting that public forums can be “of a limited or unlimited character”); Church
on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding a senior center
is a “designated public forum” while simultaneously noting the “limits” imposed on that forum).
For a succinct articulation of the difficult distinction between designated and limited public
forums, see Child Evangelism Fellowship of Maryland, Inc. v. Montgomery County Public
Schools, 457 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2006) (articulating the differences between designated and 
limited public forums). Because limited and designated public forums impose different
restrictions on what the government can regulate in those spaces, this Note will treat them as
distinct public forum categories.
59. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 829).
 60. Id. at 106–07 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
 61. See Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (“‘Content discrimination’
occurs when the government ‘choos[es] the subjects’ that may be discussed, while ‘viewpoint
discrimination’ occurs when the government prohibits ‘speech by particular speakers,’ thereby 
suppressing a particular view about a subject.” (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 59 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting))). 
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Finally, the Perry Court described nonpublic forums—“[p]ublic 
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public 
communication.”62 In these spaces, the government essentially
operates as a private property owner and may therefore properly 
impose content-based restrictions on speech.63 Government regulation 
in a nonpublic forum need only be “reasonable in light of the purpose
which the forum at issue serves.”64 
As time has progressed, the Court has applied its forum analysis 
to new and atypical locales.65 For instance, the Court has indicated that 
the public forum doctrine is not limited to government property; 
rather, public forums can be created in private spaces subject to 
sufficient government control.66 Furthermore, the Court has expanded 
the public forum doctrine beyond merely physical locations to 
encompass “metaphysical” spaces. For example, in Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,67 the Court noted that
“the same principles” of the public forum doctrine applied to the 
University of Virginia’s student-activity fund, even though it was “a 
forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense.”68 
As discussed in Part II, lower courts have found government officials’ 
social media pages to be the latest of these “metaphysical” public 
forums.
II. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A PUBLIC FORUM
Social media has undoubtedly revolutionized how politicians 
conduct campaigns and connect with their constituents.69 Sites like
62. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
63. Id. at 49; see also Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (“[O]ur
decisions have long recognized that the government may impose some content-based restrictions
on speech in nonpublic forums . . . .”).
 64. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. 
65. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250– 
52 (2015) (applying a forum analysis to Texas’s specialty-license-plate program); Rosenberger, 515 
U.S. at 830 (applying a forum analysis to the University of Virginia’s student-activity fund).
 66. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (“[A]s
an initial matter a speaker must seek access to public property or to private property dedicated to
public use to evoke First Amendment concerns . . . .” (emphasis added)); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (determining that a privately owned theater under lease to a
municipal government constituted a public forum).
67. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995).
 68. Id. at 830.
 69. Tom Murse, How Social Media Has Changed Politics, THOUGHTCO. (May 25, 2019),
https://www.thoughtco.com/how-social-media-has-changed-politics-3367534 [https://perma.cc/ 
C9LG-UVSB] (“The use of social media in politics including Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube 









   
 
   
  
 







   
 
   
 
    
 
  
   
   
 
   
  
   
   
  




   
 7132019] WHOSE FORUM IS IT ANYWAY
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube70 allow officials to respond to events
immediately, to fundraise, and to connect with voters directly and— 
perhaps most importantly—cheaply.71 Throughout the 2016 
presidential election, Donald Trump redefined the ways in which
Twitter can bolster a political campaign.72 By the 2018 midterms, 100
percent of U.S. senators and 99 percent of congresspeople posted on
Twitter.73 In spite of this rampant social media use, only a handful of 
courts have considered whether elected officials’ social media pages
constitute public forums.74 Three of these cases, involving three federal 
district courts and two circuit courts of appeals, found that the officials’ 
social media pages were public forums.75 Those opinions, which feature
remarkably similar analytical frameworks, are explored below.  
has dramatically changed the way campaigns are run and how Americans interact with their
elected officials.”). 
70. This Note focuses specifically on public forum creation with regard to social media sites
such as Facebook and Twitter, as this is where the most digital interaction between government 
officials and the public takes place. It does not consider whether other sites, such as campaign
pages or official websites, similarly fall under the ambit of the public forum doctrine.
 71. See Murse, supra note 69 (listing ways in which Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have
affected politics).
 72. See Michael Barbaro, Pithy, Mean and Powerful: How Donald Trump Mastered Twitter 
for 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/us/politics/donald-
trump-twitter-use-campaign-2016.html [https://perma.cc/4TKR-YUSM] (“Mr. Trump has
mastered Twitter in a way no candidate for president ever has, unleashing and redefining its
power as a tool of political promotion, distraction, score-settling and attack . . . .”).
 73. QUORUM, 2018 CONGRESSIONAL SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT 4, https://readymag.com/ 
u41777038/1235492/2 [https://perma.cc/WX7Y-MBD4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
74. See generally Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) (addressing whether the 
chair of a county board of supervisors violated the First Amendment by blocking someone from
her Facebook page); One Wis. Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (evaluating 
whether three Wisconsin state assemblymen violated the First Amendment by blocking an entity 
from their Twitter pages); German v. Eudaly, No. 3:17-cv-2028-MO, 2018 WL 3212020 (D. Or. 
June 29, 2018) (considering whether a Portland city commissioner violated the First Amendment
by blocking someone from her Facebook page); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ.
v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (considering whether President Donald Trump
violated the First Amendment by blocking someone from his Twitter page), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 
(2d Cir. 2019); Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (assessing whether the 
governor of Kentucky violated the First Amendment by blocking an individual from his Facebook
and Twitter pages). 
75. See Davison, 912 F.3d at 687 (determining that “the interactive component of the Chair’s
Facebook Page constitutes a public forum”); One Wis., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 955 (holding that “the
interactive portions of the defendants’ respective Twitter accounts constitute designated public
forums”); Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575 (concluding that “the interactive space of a tweet from
the @realDonaldTrump account constitutes a designated public forum”). A fourth case, Campbell
v. Reisch, 367 F. Supp. 3d 987 (W.D. Mo. 2019), has also held a state representative’s Twitter page 
is a public forum. See id. at 992 (holding that the public forum doctrine applies to a state
representative’s Twitter page and that the blocking of individuals from that page constitutes
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A. Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors76 
The first case to hold that an elected official’s social media page 
constituted a public forum was Davison v. Loudoun County Board of 
Supervisors. There, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia considered whether the chair of the Loudoun County Board 
of Supervisors, Phyllis J. Randall, violated the First Amendment when
she blocked an individual, Brian Davison, from her “Chair Phyllis J. 
Randall” Facebook page.77 Randall created the page the day before she 
took office and used it to communicate with her constituents.78 After 
participating in a town-hall discussion held by members of the Board
of Supervisors and School Board, Randall made a post on her 
Facebook page detailing the event.79 In response, Davison commented 
on the post alleging that the School Board was corrupt.80 Randall then 
blocked Davison from her page for a period of twelve hours, disabling 
him from either commenting on her page or sending her messages.81 
In Davison, the court faced “a novel legal question” regarding
when an individual official’s social media account is subject to First 
Amendment regulation.82 It opined that “the best way to answer this 
question is to examine whether the public official acts under color of 
state law or undertakes state action in maintaining the social media
account.”83 Finding that Randall’s Facebook page was “born out of,
and [was] inextricably linked to, the fact of [her] public office,” that she 
used her page “as a tool of governance,” that she spent county 
resources supporting the page, and that the page was “swathe[d] . . . in
the trappings of [Randall’s] office,” the court held that Randall acted 
under color of state law in operating her Facebook page.84 
viewpoint discrimination). However, because Campbell features facts nearly identical to One
Wisconsin, and because its doctrinal analysis lacks the depth of the other three cases, this Note
does not focus on it.
76. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d
sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
 77. Id. at 706.
 78. Id. at 707.
 79. Id. at 710.




 84. Id. at 713–14. 
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The court then considered whether Randall created a forum via
her Facebook page.85 According to the court, controlling Fourth
Circuit precedent provided that “the government may open a forum 
for speech by creating a website that includes ‘a chat room or bulletin 
board in which private viewers could express opinions or post 
information’ or that otherwise ‘invite[s] or allow[s] private persons to
publish information or their positions.’”86 Therefore, the interactive
portions of Randall’s Facebook page constituted a public forum.87 
However, the court never specified what type of forum Randall 
created.88 It reasoned that because Randall unequivocally engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination in banning Davison from her Facebook page 
and because “[v]iewpoint discrimination is ‘prohibited in all forums,’” 
it “need not pass on [that] issue.”89 
On appeal, a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel affirmed.90 The 
Fourth Circuit first upheld the district court’s determination that
Randall acted under the color of state law.91 Next, it turned its attention 
to the First Amendment issue.92 In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit first
articulated that “the hallmark of both [traditional and limited or 
designated] public fora—what renders the fora ‘public’—is that the
government has made the space available—either by designation or 
long-standing custom—for ‘expressive public conduct’ or ‘expressive 
activity,’ and the space is compatible with such activity.”93 Randall’s
page embodied this hallmark.94 
Although it acknowledged that Facebook is a private entity, the 
Fourth Circuit held that private property can constitute a public forum 
when sufficiently controlled by the government.95 The court then found 
85. Id. at 716.
 86. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275,
284 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
87. Id. at 718.
 88. Id. at 716.
 89. Id. at 716–17 (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five,
470 F.3d 1062, 1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
90. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2019). 
91. Id. at 680.
 92. Id. at 681.
 93. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
94. Id. at 682.
 95. See id. at 683 (“[T]he Supreme Court and lower courts have held that private property,
whether tangible or intangible, constituted a public forum when . . . the government retained
substantial control over the property under regulation or by contract.”). In support of this
proposition, the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s opinions in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
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that “Randall, acting under color of state law, retained and exercised 
significant control over the page” to render it a public forum.96 Like the
district court, the Fourth Circuit determined that it “need not decide”
what type of forum the interactive portion of Randall’s page 
constituted “because [her] ban of Davison amounted to ‘viewpoint 
discrimination,’ which is ‘prohibited in all forums.’”97 
B. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. 
Trump98 
In Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. 
Trump, the Knight Institute at Columbia University and seven
individual plaintiffs filed suit against President Donald Trump and 
senior White House aides after the plaintiffs were allegedly blocked 
from the president’s Twitter account, “@realDonaldTrump,” for 
criticizing the president and his policies.99 Similar to Davison, Judge 
Buchwald from the Southern District of New York addressed the issue
of “whether a public official may, consistent with the First 
Amendment, ‘block’ a person from his Twitter account in response to
the political views that person has expressed.”100 
After a lengthy discussion regarding plaintiffs’ standing to sue,101 
the district court turned to the First Amendment claims.102 As a
threshold matter, the court articulated the need to establish the 
applicability of the public forum doctrine.103 This analysis featured two 
distinct requirements: (1) “to potentially qualify as a forum, the space
in question must be owned or controlled by the government”;104 and (2) 
application of the public forum doctrine must be “consistent with the 
purpose, structure, and intended use” of the space at issue.105 
Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), Christian Legal Society Chapter of the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010), and 
Southeast Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Davison, 912 F.3d at 683.
 96. Davison, 912 F.3d at 683, 687. 
97. Id. at 687 (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470
F.3d 1062, 1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006)).
98. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
99. See id. at 549–555 (detailing the facts of the case).
 100. Id. at 549.
 101. See id. at 555–64 (addressing the standing issue). 
102. Id. at 564.
 103. Id. at 565.
 104. Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
 105. Id. at 570.
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Here, the district court found both requirements satisfied. To the
first prong, the court found that control over the putative forum was 
sufficiently “governmental in nature” to warrant designation as a
public forum.106 In support of these conclusions, it noted that Trump’s 
account presented itself as being that of the forty-fifth president of the 
United States, that the Presidential Records Act required tweets from 
that account to be preserved, and that Trump used this account to 
conduct “squarely executive functions,” such as “the appointment of 
officers . . . , the removal of officers, and the conduct of foreign
policy.”107 
The district court then considered the second requirement: 
whether applying the public forum analysis to the president’s Twitter 
account would be consistent with “the purpose, structure, and intended
use” of the Twitter account.108 It first noted that since government 
speech lay outside the bounds of the public forum doctrine, the 
personal tweets from the president’s account were not subject to a
forum analysis.109 However, “[t]he same [could not] be said” for the 
interactive spaces on the president’s Twitter page.110 Since the replies 
that populated this space were not under government control and were
more likely associated with the replying user than with the government, 
they could not qualify as government speech.111 The court further noted 
that this interactive space could “accommodate an unlimited number 
of replies and retweets” and that its “essential function . . . [was] to
allow private speakers to engage with the content of the tweet.”112 
Given these considerations, the district court concluded that applying 
a forum analysis to the interactive spaces of President Trump’s Twitter 
account was appropriate.113 
106. Id. at 566–67. 
107. Id. at 567.
 108. Id. at 570.
 109. Id. at 571. The government speech doctrine articulated by the district court in Knight
refers to the concept that “when the government ‘is speaking on its own behalf, the First 
Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-established forums do not
apply.’” Id. (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2250 (2015)). Because President Trump acted in a manner that was “governmental in nature” in
operating his Twitter account, supra note 106 and accompanying text, the district court held that 
his tweets amounted to government speech and thus fell outside the bounds of public forum
regulation. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571. 
110. Id. at 572.
 111. Id.
 112. Id. at 573.
 113. Id.
D'ANTONIO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2019 10:01 AM        















    
  
   
  
 
   




718 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:701
Unlike the courts in Davison, the district court in Knight reached
the forum-classification question.114 Here, the court determined that
the interactive portions of Trump’s tweets constituted designated 
public forums.115 In line with Davison, the district court then held that 
blocking individuals from those spaces because of their expressed 
views constituted viewpoint discrimination and thus violated the First 
Amendment.116 
A little over a year later, the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision.117 Similar to the Southern District, the Second
Circuit’s analysis began by assessing the “official nature” of President 
Trump’s Twitter account.118 Specifically, the court articulated that “[i]f,
in blocking, the President were acting in a governmental capacity, then 
he may not discriminate based on viewpoint among the private speech 
occurring in the Account’s interactive space.”119 In holding that 
President Trump did act “in a governmental capacity” in blocking 
individuals from his page, the Second Circuit emphasized the same
factors as the lower court—namely, that the account was presented as 
belonging to the president, that its contents were commemorated as
official records by the National Archives and Records Administration, 
and that the president used the account as a means to communicate
information about his administration.120 Importantly, however, the
court clarified that “not every social media account operated by a 
public official is a government account.”121 Rather, it recognized that 
each case would require “a fact-specific inquiry” that considers how the
account is used and described, who can view its contents, and how
others “regard and treat the account.”122 After finding that the public 
forum doctrine applied, the Second Circuit mimicked the lower court 
by holding that President Trump engaged in viewpoint discrimination 
114. Id.
 115. Id. at 575. The court did not, however, indicate whether the spaces were limited or
unlimited public forums. Id. 
116. Id. at 577.
117. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 240 (2d Cir.
2019). 
118. Id. at 234.
 119. Id. at 234–35 (emphasis added). 
120. See id. at 235–36 (articulating the reasons supporting the finding that President Trump
and his aides acted in a governmental capacity in operating his @realDonaldTrump Twitter
account).
 121. Id. at 236.
 122. Id.
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in blocking individuals from his Twitter page and that the government 
speech doctrine did not apply.123 
C. One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer124 
In the last of a triad of cases holding elected officials’ social media 
pages to be public forums, the Western District of Wisconsin 
considered whether three members of the Wisconsin State Assembly 
violated the First Amendment when they blocked the Twitter account 
for One Wisconsin Now (“OWN”), a progressive advocacy group, from 
their respective Twitter pages.125 State Representatives Jesse Kremer, 
John Nygren, and Robin Vos operate Twitter accounts connected with 
their elected offices.126 After each of these individuals blocked OWN 
from their pages, the group filed suit claiming that the interactive 
portions of the representatives’ Twitter pages were public forums and 
that therefore the officials violated the First Amendment by blocking 
OWN from those spaces.127 
At the outset, the court acknowledged its reliance on the “three-
step [forum] analysis set forth in [Davison and Knight].”128 First, in
order to determine whether the public forum analysis was even
applicable, the court considered whether the representatives acted
under color of state law in creating and maintaining their Twitter 
accounts.129 Using factors gleaned from the Davison decisions, the 
court similarly found that the officials’ creation and operation of 
Twitter accounts constituted state action.130 Next, it considered 
whether the interactive components of the defendants’ Twitter 
accounts were public forums.131 Again leaning on the rationales in 
Knight and Davison, the court concluded that these spaces were
designated public forums.132 
123. Id. at 236–40. Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit elected not to specify what
type of forum President Trump’s Twitter account created, noting only that the president’s
“conduct created a public forum” and that “[i]f the Account is a forum—public or otherwise— 
viewpoint discrimination is not permitted by the government.” Id. at 237. 
124. One Wis. Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940 (W.D. Wis. 2019).
 125. Id. at 941.
 126. Id. at 947–48. 
127. Id. at 949.
 128. Id.
 129. Id. at 950.
 130. Id. at 951.
 131. Id. at 953.
 132. See id. at 953–55 (citing Knight and Davison in support of the court’s reasoning). 
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Finally, in a slight variation from Knight and Davison, the One
Wisconsin court examined whether defendants engaged in content-
based discrimination, rather than viewpoint discrimination.133 Though 
the former prohibits all discussion on a particular topic, regardless of 
the views being shared, the latter disfavors only particular viewpoints 
or beliefs regarding a particular subject matter.134 Finding that the
defendants blocked OWN because of its “prior speech or identity”— 
that is, the content of its messages—and that no compelling state 
interest justified such action, the court concluded that the 
representatives violated the First Amendment.135 
III. FAULTS IN DAVISON, KNIGHT, AND ONE WISCONSIN
The foregoing decisions represent some of the first—but surely
not the last—cases to assess whether individual government officials’ 
social media pages constitute public forums.136 And as One Wisconsin
illustrates, subsequent courts are likely to rely on earlier analyses in
formulating their own decisions in this area.137 This Part posits that
Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin should not be the models for 
social-media-page forum analysis, however, because these decisions 
muddy the doctrinal waters more than they clarify them.  
This argument proceeds in three sections. Section A notes that the 
mere application of the public forum doctrine implies that a 
133. Id. at 955. The distinction between content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination is
discussed in Part I, but it is subtle enough to warrant reiteration here. A restriction constitutes
content-based discrimination when it “exclude[s] speech [from a forum] based on its content.” Id.
Government entities regulating traditional or designated public forums are prohibited from
imposing content-based restrictions unless those restrictions satisfy strict scrutiny. Id. By contrast,
a regulation is viewpoint discriminatory when it prohibits “particular views taken by speakers on
a subject.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
Although government entities operating a limited public forum are permitted to engage in certain 
forms of content-based discrimination to “confin[e] a forum to the limited and legitimate
purposes for which it was created,” they are prohibited from “discriminat[ing] against speech on
the basis of its viewpoint.” Id.
 134. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (opining that the University of Virginia’s exclusion of a 
religious newspaper from its funding program was viewpoint discrimination because “the
University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those 
student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints”).
 135. One Wis., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 956.
 136. See, e.g., Hikind v. Ocasio-Cortez, No. 1:19-cv-03956 (E.D.N.Y filed July 9, 2019)
(alleging, on the same day that the Second Circuit decided Knight, that Representative
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez violated the First Amendment by blocking an individual from her
public Twitter page).
 137. See One Wis., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 953–55 (citing Knight and Davison in support of the 
court’s reasoning). 
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government entity has acted to create the putative forum. Section B 
then describes the doctrinal support Davison, Knight, and One
Wisconsin seem to provide for that determination: the “under color of 
state law” or “governmental capacity” inquiries. Section C argues that
reliance on these inquiries is misguided, however, as they do not, in
fact, establish the appropriateness of the public forum doctrine’s 
application to the defendants’ social media pages. 
A. The Governmental-Entity Syllogism
The mere application of a public forum analysis in Davison, 
Knight, and One Wisconsin implies that a governmental entity was 
involved in the creation or operation of the putative forum. This point 
can be proven using a simple syllogism. Traditionally, the public forum 
doctrine has only applied in cases where a “governmental entity” has 
acted to create a space for free speech or where individuals have acted
pursuant to an authorized government program.138 Indeed, as Dean 
Rodney Smolla articulates, “[t]he rich body of First Amendment public 
forum law consists exclusively of ‘cases in which a unit of government
creates a limited public forum for private speech.’”139 In other words,
based on the Court’s own case law, the existence of a governmental 
entity appears to be a necessary condition for the imposition of the 
public forum doctrine. For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector, 
mentioned above, the Supreme Court applied the public forum 
doctrine only after establishing—in the very first line of the opinion— 
that regulation was imposed by the University of Virginia, “an 
instrumentality of the Commonwealth [of Virginia] . . . bound by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.”140 
138. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 692 (Keenan, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court 
[in Matal v. Tam] recently cited a series of decisions in which ‘a unit of government’ had created
a public forum.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017))); 
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 8:33.25 (“The rich body of First Amendment public forum
law consists exclusively of ‘cases in which a unit of government creates a limited public forum for
private speech.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763)); see also Christian
Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679
(2010) (“[I]n a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis to determine when a 
governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on speech.”
(emphasis added)); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 792 (1985)
(applying a forum analysis to a charitable fundraising organization conducted in the federal
workplace and authorized by executive order).
 139. SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 8:33.25 (quoting Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763).
140. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995).
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Given this background, one can logically conclude that if a court 
finds that the public forum doctrine applies, it follows that a
government entity must have created or controlled the putative forum.
The courts in Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin found application 
of the public forum doctrine to be appropriate. Thus, to complete the 
syllogism, these courts must have implicitly determined that the parties
responsible for creating or controlling those pages—the officials in 
question and their staffs—were, in fact, government entities.
B. The “Under Color of State Law” and “Governmental Capacity” 
Inquiries 
The Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin courts appeared to 
support this implicit determination by establishing that the official in
question acted “under color of state law” or “in a governmental 
capacity.” By moving from these analyses straight to application of the
public forum doctrine, the courts seemed to assume that no 
independent inquiry was necessary to establish the existence of a
governmental entity.141 The primary question considered by the courts 
in Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin was whether the defendants’ 
conduct in creating and maintaining their social media pages could be
fairly defined as action by the government.142 
Because Davison and One Wisconsin dealt with § 1983 claims
against state officials, the courts there asked whether the defendants 
acted “under color of state law” in creating and maintaining their social
media pages.143 The district court in Davison defined “under color of
state law” as “occur[ing] where ‘apparently private actions . . . have a 
sufficiently close nexus with the State to be fairly treated as’ the actions 
of ‘the State itself.’”144 After finding that a number of factors connected
141. This assumption can be inferred from the framework of the courts’ decisions. In each
case, the court moves directly from its state-action analysis to the application of the public forum
doctrine. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
 142. See supra notes 83–84, 93–97, 103–11, 118–18, 129–28 and accompanying text (discussing
the state- or governmental-action analysis conducted by the courts in each case).
 143. See supra notes 83–84, 129–27 and accompanying text (articulating the “under color of
state law” analysis in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D.
Va. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) and One Wisconsin
Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940 (W.D. Wis. 2019)); infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text
(same). 
144. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th 
Cir. 2003)); see also One Wis., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 950 (“A court may also find action by a private 
actor to be under color of state law if there is a ‘sufficient nexus between the state and the private
actor’ to show that ‘the deprivation committed by the private actor is fairly attributable to the
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Chairwoman Randall’s Facebook page to her office, the court 
determined that Randall’s maintenance of her page—including barring 
the plaintiff from accessing it—constituted state action.145 The court in
One Wisconsin engaged in an identical analysis that asked whether the
representatives’ operation of their Twitter pages constituted state
action.146 Conversely, because Knight involved claims against a federal
official, there was no § 1983 claim and thus no need for a state-action 
inquiry.147 Nonetheless, the Knight court engaged in a similar analysis 
that asked whether President Trump’s actions on Twitter were 
“governmental in nature.”148 
In fact, although these decisions employed nominally different 
inquiries, their analyses effectively boiled down to the same question— 
whether a “nexus” existed between the individual actor and the
government. Unsurprisingly, these similar analyses led to similar 
outcomes. Namely, after determining that the defendants acted “under 
color of state law” or exercised control that was “governmental in 
nature,” each court found a sufficiently governmental element to
justify applying the public forum doctrine.149 
state.’” (quoting L.P. v. Marian Catholic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017))). The courts
in Davison and One Wisconsin often use the terms “under color of state law” and “state action” 
interchangeably to refer to the same inquiry. For clarity’s sake, this Note will exclusively use the 
term “under color of state law” when referring to this standard. 
145. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 714.
 146. See One Wis., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 950–53 (applying an “under color of state law” analysis
to all three assemblymen). 
147. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 568 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that the court need not engage in the “under the color of state law”
analysis in the forum context), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). Section 1983 is a federal statute
that provides prospective and remedial relief to plaintiffs who have suffered violations of federal
law at the hands of persons acting under the authority of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against federal officials.
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1973) (“[A]ctions of the Federal 
Government and its officers are at least facially exempt from [§ 1983’s] proscriptions.”).
 148. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67. The court confirmed that because the president 
“present[ed his Twitter account] as being a presidential account as opposed to a personal account 
and, more importantly, use[d] the account to take actions that can be taken only by the President 
as President,” his actions were “governmental.” Id. at 567. 
149. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 681 (4th Cir. 2019) (proceeding from the
determination that Randall acted under the color of state law to the question of whether she
created a public forum); One Wis., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 950–953 (proceeding from a determination
that each of the assemblymen acted “under color of state law” directly to a forum analysis);
Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67 (indicating that President Trump and his media director’s
“governmental” control over his account implicates a forum analysis).  
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C. A False Equivalency: The “Under Color of State Law” and 
“Governmental Capacity” Inquiries’ Inability To Establish that a 
Governmental Entity is Acting
These two analyses, however, are deeply flawed. Both improperly
equate a finding that the individual acted “under color of state law” or 
“governmental in nature” with the separate determination that a 
government entity existed to create the putative forum.150 Put
differently, determining that an individual acted “under color of state 
law” or in a “governmental capacity” does not establish that the
individual is the government or a government entity.151 A finding that 
an official acted “under color of law” merely indicates that a 
“sufficiently close nexus” exists between the individual’s actions and
the state such that the individual action is “fairly attributable to the 
State.”152 It does not establish that the individual official is acting as the 
state, nor does it ask whether the official has the power to act as the
state. 
To illustrate, consider state-officer liability. Under § 1983, a 
plaintiff can bring suit for monetary damages against a state official in 
her personal capacity when that official, while acting “under color of 
state law,” deprives the individual of a federal right.153 By contrast,
damages suits against a state or against state officials in their “official 
capacities” are barred because the Court has determined that the term 
“persons” in § 1983 does not encompass these entities.154 If, however, 
by virtue of acting “under color of state law,” the official was actually 
synonymous with the state, it would make little sense how a § 1983 suit 
could proceed against her; it would seem that a suit against that official, 
even in her personal capacity, would be “no different from a suit 
150. Cf. SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 8:33.25 (“The question of whether an official is
acting under ‘color of law’ or engaged in ‘state action’ should not be conflated with the separate
First Amendment question of how and when a public forum comes into existence.”).
 151. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (determining that officers can be held to 
have acted “under color of law” in violating the Fourth Amendment even when acting contrary
to the state constitution and state statutes), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 8:33.25 (“Individual
government officials who engage in action not officially authorized or endorsed by a government 
entity may at times be deemed to be acting ‘under color of law’ in violating a person’s federal
rights.”). 
152. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
 153. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (stating that government officials can be sued
in their personal capacities for damages under § 1983). 
154. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
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against the State itself.”155 Therefore, it must be that even when state 
officials are acting “under color of state law,” there is some tangible
difference between themselves and the state government itself. 
Otherwise, it would make little sense why the Court has painstakingly 
differentiated between the two in its § 1983 jurisprudence.156 
This logic applies with equal force to the governmental analysis in 
Knight. Simply because an official’s actions are “governmental in
nature” does not mean that official has assumed the mantle of acting
as the government.157 For example, an individual congressperson 
speaking from the congressional floor regarding a bill could be said to 
be taking action that is “governmental in nature,” but no one would 
sincerely argue that such action could be attributed to the government 
itself.158 That is not to say that individual government officials can never 
act as the government. For instance, if the EPA administrator posted
the language of a final rule on his Twitter page after an extensive 
rulemaking process, that action could be characterized as both
“governmental in nature” and as an act of the government. 
The ultimate downfall of the Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin
analyses is that they skip the threshold question; each opinion fails to 
ask who is acting to create the putative forum, assuming instead that a
determination that an official acted “under color of state law” or in a 
“governmental capacity” automatically proves she is a governmental 
entity. These courts fail to recognize the faulty assumptions underlying 
their own inquiries and therefore fail to establish a sound and
convincing foundation for the applicability of the public forum 
doctrine. 
In addition to being logically suspect, the courts’ analyses in these 
cases were flawed as a matter of free-speech policy. Specifically, their 
overreliance on the “under color of state law” or “governmental 
capacity” tests in this public forum context encroaches on public 
officials’ own right to free expression. Undoubtedly, individual 
155. Id.
 156. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“Because this distinction 
apparently continues to confuse lawyers and confound lower courts, we attempt to define it more
clearly through concrete examples of the practical and doctrinal differences between personal and
official capacity actions.”).
 157. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 569 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (describing President Trump and his media director’s control of his Twitter
account as “governmental in nature”), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
158. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen
public officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are not exclusively a 
transmission from the government . . . .”).
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government officials retain some capacity to act as private persons free 
from constitutional limitations. Of course, it is equally true that the 
scope of any official’s ability to act as a private person is limited by the 
nature of his or her specific office; thus, the president’s ability to 
conduct herself in a manner that is free from constitutional restriction
is likely narrower than that of a state assemblyman.  
When the Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin courts overstate 
the bounds of the “under color of state law” or “governmental 
capacity” inquiries, however, this distinction between public and 
private speech is effectively lost, and government officials become
unduly constricted by a public forum doctrine that stretches past the 
point of government-entity conduct and into the sphere of private,
personal speech. The next Part suggests a reform to the public forum 
doctrine that properly limits the scope of its application to government 
entities only, thereby reestablishing a clear line between public and 
private speech for government officials. 
IV. UPDATING THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE: THE 
“GOVERNMENT ENTITY” INQUIRY
Although Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin dutifully apply the 
Court’s precedent, their flawed analyses ultimately prove how 
awkward it is to analogize current public forum case law to individual 
social media pages. By focusing entirely on what type of action is 
necessary to establish a public forum, these analyses neglect to ask who
has the necessary authority to create a public forum. Yet the who is the 
truly important—and potentially dispositive—issue in these cases. 
Thus, Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin leave a key question 
unanswered: When can the public forum doctrine be applied to
individual government actors operating a public space? 
The need to delineate exactly when individual government 
officials can be considered governmental entities is essential to this 
question. This Note proposes that courts should answer this question 
by undertaking a “government entity” inquiry, which asks whether an
official retains such authority that he or she can be properly viewed as 
a “government entity” with the ability to create a public forum. A 
“government entity” inquiry would provide not only a much-needed 
limiting principle to public forum analyses in cases involving individual
government actors, but also would better signal to politicians and other 
public officials the constitutional restraints imposed on their social
media presence.  
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This Part proceeds in four sections. First, it assesses what the term 
“government entity” has generally meant in public forum case law. 
Next, it details the specific framework for a “governmental entity” 
inquiry. It then applies this new inquiry to a variety of exemplary cases 
in order to demonstrate its utility. Finally, it discusses the benefits of
this new threshold standard. 
A. What is a “Government Entity”? 
To articulate when an individual government official may be 
considered a “government entity” for forum-analysis purposes, it is 
necessary to establish what this term has signified in the public forum 
context. Although the Court has never explicitly defined what 
constitutes a “government entity,” its precedent is still instructive. For 
example, the Court has applied the public forum doctrine to various 
actions by a spectrum of federal, state, and local governments, 
agencies, and institutional governing bodies, including state-university 
boards, state transportation departments, and federal agencies.159 
Importantly, in each of these cases, the subject entity always 
exercised some independent authority to limit or alter the rights of 
individuals operating—or seeking to operate—within that space. For 
example, in the state-university cases, the schools enacted funding 
policies affecting the disbursement of money at their respective 
universities.160 Likewise, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Education Fund, Inc.,161 the federal government—via the Office of 
159. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243, 2251– 
53 (2015) (considering whether a forum analysis applies to a specialty-license-plate program run
by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board); Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ.
of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 682 (2010) (determining that the
funding program coordinated by a public law school constituted a limited public forum);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822, 830 (1995) (determining that
a newspaper funding program initiated by the University of Virginia—“an instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth [of Virginia]”—constituted a public forum); Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 675 (1992) (applying a forum analysis to the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey’s restrictions on pamphleteering and leafletting within airport terminals);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985) (conducting a forum
analysis to determine whether restrictions imposed by the Office of Personnel Management on
access to the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive created by executive order, violated
the First Amendment).
 160. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 670 (detailing the nondiscrimination policy enacted
by the College that regulated its funding program); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824, 830 (determining
that the newspaper funding program organized by the University of Virginia and its governing 
board was a limited public forum and that the University set “Guidelines” regulating the 
disbursement of funds from that program).
161. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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Personnel Management—regulated what types of nonprofit 
organizations could participate in a charitable fundraising drive
conducted in the federal workplace.162 Finally, at issue in International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee163 was the policy of the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which prohibited 
leafletting and solicitation of money in airport terminals.164 Based on 
these precedents, to qualify as a “government entity,” the individual or 
unit at issue must possess the ability to regulate or somehow 
unilaterally change the obligations or rights of persons or organizations 
within the putative forum.
A concurring opinion in Davison sheds additional light on what 
constitutes a government entity. Though she agreed with the ultimate 
outcome, Judge Keenan expressed doubts about the widespread 
applicability of the public forum doctrine to individual government 
officials’ social media pages.165 Citing language from Matal v. Tam166 
indicating that “unit[s] of government” create a public forum,167 she
noted that “it appears to be an open question whether an individual
public official serving in a legislative capacity qualifies as . . . a 
government entity for purposes of her ability to open a public forum.”168 
Judge Keenan further opined that “[t]he nature and extent of a public 
official’s authority should have some bearing on the official’s ability to 
open a public forum on social media.”169 Despite observing that the 
record was “silent regarding the Chair’s authority to take any official 
action on her own,” Judge Keenan proceeded to note that “under given
circumstances, [an elected official] can conduct government business 
and set official policy unilaterally, including through the use of social 
media.”170 Judge Keenan thus appears to view a “government entity”
as an institutional body or individual capable of unilaterally setting 
official policy or conducting business on behalf of the government.
162. See id. at 795 (articulating the fundraising policy imposed by the Office of Personnel
Management that excluded certain nonprofits from participation).
163. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
164. See id. at 675.
 165. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 692 (4th Cir. 2019) (Keenan, J., concurring) (“I
question whether any and all public officials, regardless of their roles, should be treated equally 
in their ability to open a public forum on social media.”).
166. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
 167. Id. at 1763. 
168. Davison, 912 F.3d at 692 (Keenan, J., concurring) (citing Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763). 
169. Id.
 170. Id. (citing Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019)).
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Taken in conjunction, these sources seem to indicate that a 
“government entity,” in the public forum context, denotes some
governing body—either federal, state, or local—capable of acting 
unilaterally to set government policy, conduct official government 
business, or otherwise change or clarify the rights or obligations of 
individuals operating within its purview. 
B. When Should an Individual Public Official Be Considered a 
“Government Entity”? 
This Note does not contend that public officials can never
constitute government entities for forum-creation purposes. Rather, it 
seeks to develop a clear standard for when individual government 
officials can be considered government entities capable of creating 
public forums. Here, reference to § 1983 municipal-liability 
jurisprudence can be used to help develop a workable standard.  
Under § 1983, a municipal government can only be liable where 
“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an 
entity is responsible.”171 In other words, a § 1983 suit that alleges 
municipal liability for an impermissible official policy is only valid 
when an individual government official acts with such authority that 
her policy choice can be fairly characterized as a policy choice made by
the municipal entity itself.172 Thus, only those municipal officials who
can “make municipal policy”173 or “speak with final policymaking
authority”174 are able to subject a municipality to liability through their 
actions. Put differently, only certain municipal officials—those with
some final decision-making power—retain such requisite authority 
that their impermissible acts can be characterized as the acts of the 
municipality itself. 
Akin to § 1983 municipal liability, public forum cases involving 
individual government actors should feature a threshold inquiry that 
asks whether the government official wields such authority that she can 
171. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
 172. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986) (noting that the “‘official
policy’ requirement” for § 1983 suits “was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from
acts of employees of the municipality,” thereby limiting the liability of municipalities under the
statute “to acts that are, properly speaking, acts ‘of the municipality’”).  
173. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at
483).
174. Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
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fairly be characterized as a government entity. This “government 
entity” inquiry would consider whether the putative official is endowed 
with the authority to take unilateral, final action on behalf of the 
government.175 Such “unilateral, final action” would include the ability
to set or establish official policy, conduct government business, or 
otherwise clarify and alter individuals’ legal rights. Only public officials 
deemed to have such power would qualify as government entities. In 
this new public forum framework, absent a finding that the 
governmental official maintains such authority that she can be fairly 
characterized as a government entity, application of the public forum 
doctrine would be improper. 
C. Benefits of a “Government Entity” Inquiry 
The “government entity” inquiry preserves the animating purpose 
of the public forum doctrine, which is to lend “legal acknowledgement”
to individuals “who want[] to reach a public audience” in public 
spaces,176 while also protecting “the private choices of [certain] political 
officeholders . . . to choose the views with which to associate.”177 
Undoubtedly, the core of the First Amendment protects individuals’ 
right to engage in civil discourse freely, especially with their own 
government.178 The “government entity” inquiry preserves this 
important principle by certifying that those individual officials that may 
fairly be characterized as the government or as government entities 
remain responsive to the public forum doctrine’s directives. However, 
this standard simultaneously ensures that those public officials that
lack the requisite authority to be characterized as government entities 
remain free from First Amendment restraints. By doing so, the
175. The basis for this standard is informed by an amalgam of the abovementioned public
forum precedent, § 1983 municipal liability, and Judge Keenan’s concurrence in Davison. See
supra Part IV.A (discussing the meaning of “government entity” in the Court’s public forum
precedent and in Judge Keenan’s concurrence in Davison); supra notes 171–75 and accompanying 
text (discussing § 1983 municipal-liability jurisprudence and its requirement that an official
“speak with final policymaking authority” in order to characterize her misconduct as the
municipality’s official policy).
 176. Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between Democratic
and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 115 (2010). 
177. SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 8:33.25.
 178. See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1538 (1998) (“[T]he public forum doctrine . . . . derives from the most basic
mythological image of free speech: an agitated but eloquent speaker standing on a soap box at 
Speakers’ Corner, railing against injustices committed by the government, whose agents are 
powerless to keep the audience from hearing the speaker’s damning words.”).
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“government entity” inquiry embodies another core concept of the
First Amendment: “[T]hat each person should decide for himself or 
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and 
adherence.”179 
Normatively, the “government entity” inquiry ensures that 
individual officials who lack the authority to act as the government are 
not forced to propagate messages with which they disagree. 
Admittedly, it would enable certain public officials—most notably 
individual legislators—to block individuals from their official social 
media pages. However, where an individual official lacks the power to 
act as the government, concerns about limiting a speaker’s ability to 
publish views in a public space wane while the argument for allowing
public officials to regulate the nongovernmental content presented on 
their pages increases in strength. Especially in an age when social 
media presence is an integral and ostensibly mandatory part of public 
office,180 public officials that lack the requisite authority to create
public forums should be able to dissociate from messages with which 
they disagree.
Further, an articulated “government entity” standard provides an
important limiting principle for applying the public forum doctrine to
individual officials’ actions. Without this limit in place, the logic of 
Davison, Knight, and One Wisconsin could conceivably subject to
increased regulation any government official whose conduct bears a 
sufficiently close nexus to government authority. Such a determination 
that all public officials can create public forums would restrict far too
much speech181 and flout the exhortation that “we should be cautious 
in applying our free speech precedents to the internet.”182 However, a 
categorical rule that no public official’s social media page can
constitute a public forum is equally problematic because it would fail
to recognize the many ways in which individual government actors can 
use these sites to conduct official government business. For example, 
President Trump has used his Twitter account to appoint and remove 
179. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
 180. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
181. See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 8:33.25 (“When speaking from their private
platforms, [public officeholders] retain their First Amendment rights to compose their own
messages, and to determine the messages of others with which they will or will not associate,
endorse, or propagate.”); Briggs, supra note 27, at 34–35 (detailing ways in which government 
officials can monitor their social media sites as public forums, including privatizing their pages or
regulating using content-neutral “rules”).
182. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1744 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring).
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key cabinet members.183 A middle-of-the-road approach that 
recognizes only certain officials retain the requisite authority to create 
public forums would strike an appropriate balance between these 
competing interests. 
D. The Inquiry in Action
To see how this “government entity” inquiry would function in a 
potential public forum analysis, it is instructive to apply it as a threshold 
question to a list of exemplary cases. Only once it is established that a 
public official has the requisite authority to be fairly characterized as a
government entity would a court be permitted to move on to a forum 
analysis. As suggested by the Second Circuit in Knight, this inquiry
should be an inherently “fact-specific” endeavor that assesses how the 
official uses his or her social media page and what authority those
actions carry.184 To illustrate the inquiry’s viability, this Section applies 
it to the facts of Knight, One Wisconsin, and Davison, as well as to the 
situations of Senator Scott and Representative Omar from the
Introduction, to indicate how these cases would play out with this 
added analytical step. 
Beginning with Knight, application of the “government entity” 
inquiry would likely yield the same result arrived at by the Southern
District of New York. Because President Trump, as the top executive 
officer, used his Twitter page to set government policy, change or 
clarify individuals’ rights and obligations, and otherwise act 
unilaterally as the government, he would fairly easily classify as a 
government entity for public forum purposes.185 By using Twitter to 
make cabinet-level changes in personnel, “to announce foreign policy 
decisions and initiatives,” and “as an important tool of governance and
executive outreach,”186 President Trump undoubtedly functioned as a
“government entity” under this test. As such, the president would be
capable of creating a public forum, and the court would proceed to its 
forum analysis. 
183. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2018, 8:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/973540316656623616 [https://perma.cc/V99G-
EECF] (removing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and appointing Mike Pompeo to the position).
184. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236 (2d Cir.
2019). 
185. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 567 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (detailing the president’s ability to take unilateral action via his Twitter account),
aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). 
186. Knight, 928 F.3d at 236. 















    
  
  
      
 7332019] WHOSE FORUM IS IT ANYWAY
Conversely, a “government entity” inquiry in One Wisconsin
would likely preclude any finding that the individual assemblymen 
were capable of creating a public forum. As individual legislators, the 
officials at issue lack any unilateral authority to set government policy, 
conduct government business, or otherwise affect individuals’ rights or 
obligations. Indeed, the court in One Wisconsin is entirely silent on 
how the legislators used their pages to conduct government business;
unlike Knight, the record is devoid of evidence indicating that the 
legislators were able to take any official action via their social media
pages.187 Without any indication that these officials were able to use
their pages in order to conduct unilateral government action, they 
could not be considered government entities for forum-creation 
purposes. 
Davison is the borderline case. As Judge Keenan indicated, “the 
record . . . is silent regarding the Chair’s authority to take any official 
action on her own.”188 However, like President Trump, Chairwoman
Randall used her page as “a tool of governance,” organizing disaster-
relief efforts as well as “submit[ing] posts on behalf of the Loudoun
County Board of Supervisors as a whole.”189 Such use indicates that 
Chairwoman Randall acted as a government entity in operating her 
social media page, conducting official government business and setting 
government policy. As such, application of the public forum doctrine
to her Facebook page would be warranted.
Concluding with Senator Scott and Representative Omar, a 
“government entity” inquiry would reveal that they do not have the
ability to create public forums via their Twitter pages. Similar to the 
assemblymen in One Wisconsin, these legislators lack the authority to 
take unilateral government action or in any way conduct official 
government policy via their social media pages. As such, Senator Scott 
and Representative Omar would not constitute government entities 
and would be free to regulate their pages without fear of contravening 
the First Amendment. 
187. See One Wis. Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 950–53 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (failing to
identify any way in which the individual state assemblymen used their social media pages to
conduct government business). 
188. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 692 (4th Cir. 2019) (Keenan, J., concurring).
189. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713, 714 (E.D. Va.
2017). 
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CONCLUSION
The modern internet has radically transformed the ways in which 
individuals communicate and share their views with the world. As 
purveyors of this new digital-speech regime, social media sites are 
uniquely situated as perhaps “the most important places . . . for the 
exchange of views.”190 With speech continuously transitioning from 
physical to virtual forums, the expansion of free-speech safeguards into 
these spaces is a necessary and appropriate outgrowth. However, 
vigorous protection of these new modes of free expression must be
tempered with “cautious[ness] in applying free speech precedents to 
the internet.”191 
With a jurisprudence predominantly focused on speech 
regulations in government-owned or -operated physical spaces, the 
current public forum doctrine has proven ill-equipped to assess 
satisfactorily the First Amendment implications at stake when
individual government actors operate social media pages. By
suggesting a standard that makes establishment of an official’s status 
as a government entity a prerequisite to application of a forum analysis, 
this Note helps the public forum doctrine evolve to address an 
emerging and important area for free speech. Undoubtedly, the 
doctrine’s protection of open and free access to places of public 
discussion is essential to the proliferation of the marketplace of ideas, 
especially in a world that is becoming increasingly privatized.192 
However, when forum limitations are imposed absent any actual action
by a government entity, that lofty conception of speech protection 
begins to look more like speech restriction.193 By establishing a line 
between sincere government action and mere government affiliation in 
the forum-creation context, the “government entity” inquiry helps 
balance the right of individuals to the free expression of ideas in
dedicated spaces with the equally important right of public officials to 
dissociate from content they do not wish to endorse. 
190. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
 191. Id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring). 
192. See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178,
1201 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[O]pen access to traditional public fora guarantees the continued vitality
of the First Amendment, especially in light of the growing privatization of many traditional public
fora.”), rev’d en banc, 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011). 
193. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573– 
75 (1995) (noting that free speech in part “boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound
a particular point of view”).
